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ABSTRACT 
 
Quasi-public institutions are significant but unsung players in the contemporary international financial order. 
What can be understood as quasi-public institutions (QPIs) have been created by states or private 
associations to provide a means of mediating private capital with public value, typically attracting domestic 
and international investment in order to foster and further a domestic agenda that has strong support from 
the broader population. As such they fit awkwardly with common perceptions of the international political 
economy as dominated institutions that reflect either state or market interests. QPIs do both and have 
emerged as institutional responses to domestic crises that then go on to have a role in shaping the world 
economy. QPIs that issue collaterized securities from mortgage credit, be they public or private in origin, 
reflect this institutional form given that their purpose is to bring together private capital and public value. This 
purpose also makes QPIs sensitive to everyday politics, given that they were created to reflect a broad social 
purpose rather than only elite interests. This article discusses the development of QPIs for mortgage bonds 
in a liberal market economy, the U.S., and a coordinated market economy, Denmark. I suggest that QPIs’ 
values have been challenged by de-regulatory and re-regulatory trends in recent decades.  I suggest that 
QPIs call upon us to question how we identify actors in the international financial order as either public or 
private, and the importance of everyday politics in fostering institutional innovations that have significant 
knock-on effects for the world economy. 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
Quasi-public institutions, everyday politics, finance, mortgage bonds, liberal market economy, coordinated 
market economy. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
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The popular image of a world awash with private capital, and under the command of ‘private 
authority’, underestimates the power of the governments to shape regulatory environments within 
the contemporary international financial order. While we recognize that governments face serious 
constraints in how they are assessed by actors in international financial markets, such as 
sovereign bond rating agencies (Mosley, 2002), and that they have often delegated authority to 
such organizations (Abdelal, 2007), it is important to recognize institutions created to mediate 
between private capital and public value. This Special Issue, to which this article seeks to 
contribute, places the spotlight on a range of issues and actors that are typically ignored, 
neglected, or misunderstood. Following this ambition, this article places attention on the role of 
quasi-public institutions (QPIs) that are instrumental in mortgage bond systems in liberal and 
coordinated market economies, and how their role is evolving in the international financial order. 
The particular concern of the article is how QPIs are coping as a mediator between the particular 
interests of private capital and broader societal interests of maintaining public values. I suggest 
that quasi-public institutions are significant but unsung players in the contemporary international 
financial order, and that they may be used as a particularly effective barometer for understanding 
broader changes in regulation and governance in the international political economy. This is 
particularly the case because unlike more conventional institutions in the international political 
economy, which can be identified as representing either public authority (be they national or 
intergovernmental institutions) or private authority (market institutions), QPIs mediate between 
these two spheres in representing a broad domestic audience but, in doing so, also shape the 
character of the international financial order. This is particularly important given that QPIs are not 
typically considered to be a common actor in the international political economy – perhaps 
because of their non-conformity with public and private distinctions – even though they have 
gained the attention of comparative political economists concerned with domestic regional systems 
of governance (Deeg, 1999), business innovation systems (Ibata-Arens, 2003), and pilot agencies 
for late-development (Yoshimatsu, 2003). This article seeks to demonstrate how QPIs provide a 
window into seeing the social sources of financial power by linking ‘everyday politics’ to institutions 
commonly seen as far removed from the public eye. In short, as institutions that mediate between 
the specific interests of private capital and broader social interests of public values, QPIs are 
informed by everyday political, social and economic behaviours rather than conforming solely to 
the interests of elite coalitions or private financial institutions.  
 
The ‘mortgage QPIs’ I focus upon have provided the means to coordinate investment for 
commonly held private goods that provide a social and public function, namely to support the 
purchase of residential property through the recycling of capital via the issue of collaterised 
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securities from mortgage credit. In particular, I discuss institutions that issue bonds sourced from 
pooled mortgages payments via commercial financial institutions, where the key role of the QPI is 
to source investment to permit the recycling of capital within the domestic political economy, 
reducing the costs of capital and, therefore, providing a subsidy to potential homeowners. I focus 
on two cases, the U.S. and Denmark. Immediately, there is a counterintuitive aspect here, an 
inversion on what we would expect from a ‘liberal market economy’ (LME) and a ‘coordinated 
market economy’ (CME; see Hall and Soskice, 2001). In the former, the U.S, state-developed 
mortgage QPIs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (and Ginnie Mae in the public market) act as 
‘instruments of national policy’. These institutions were created directly from the transformation of a 
civil rights discourse alongside the need to improve liquidity within the domestic financial system. In 
the latter, Denmark, the transformation of community-led mortgage credit institutions (MCIs) from 
mutual borrowers associations into publicly trade companies permitted the most concentrated 
mortgage bond market in Europe (IMF, 2007: 14). As these institutions are heavily regulated by the 
Danish government and evoke public political support, I consider them to be mortgage QPIs. It is 
particularly noteworthy that these Danish institutions have transformed through harmonization with 
directives for European financial integration. These two cases are also chosen because they 
represent mortgage bond securitization systems that have the longest legacies, provide 20- to 30-
year fixed-interest mortgage bonds as financial options for investors, and are considered ‘best 
practice’ models of QPIs to be exported to transition economies (OECD, 2005).1  
 
Importantly, these two cases also demonstrate how mortgage QPIs are created by rights-based 
discourses that seek to link the private acquisition of wealth and property with collective action for a 
common public good. Here everyday politics is important in providing impulses for institutional 
innovation and, importantly, boundaries on what is legitimate policy action for political coalitions 
and financial elites that, in the study of the international political economy, we would normally 
consider to be in charge of institutional change. In both cases discussed here mortgage QPIs were 
built on rights-based discourses, where institutions were created (publicly or privately) to provide 
not only access to credit but also to compensate those who have been savaged by war or disaster, 
or those who suffered from discrimination. Under the conditions provided by the post-World War II 
welfare state, mortgage QPIs were able to extend their role and became associated with a need to 
support minority and low-income groups in liberal or residual welfare systems (the U.S.) or the 
provision of welfare for the middle-classes in universal systems (in Denmark, see Esping-
Andersen, 1990). However, with the shift to neo-liberal policies in the 1980s these same 
institutions were deregulated and privatized, often with an explicit aim to integrate them into the 
international financial order. For Denmark conforming to directives for European financial 
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integration was important. In both cases the transformation of QPIs calls into question their 
connection with their capacity to reflect the impulses everyday politics they were intended to 
represent, or whether ideas and practices concerning how the economy should work have 
changed among the broader population. As Vivien Schmidt has argued (2003, 2008), institutional 
change is not made only with reference to economic constraints, fighting among political coalitions, 
or path dependence, but also discourse. These discourses may be coordinative among elites 
actors, or also communicative among elites and the public. The point here is that everyday politics 
in its informal manifestations (discussed below) provides boundaries on what is legitimately 
possible for institutional change. Obtaining such information is important because it invites us to 
reflect on the social purpose of institutions that operate in markets typically considered private and 
normally considered unimportant for change in the world economy. As will be discussed, QPIs 
have played an increasingly important role in the international political economy in the past quarter-
century and, as we know from the sub-prime crisis of 2007-8, investment into residential property 
markets can have global financial consequences. Understanding how such investments have 
occurred without tracing the institutional environment that made it possible provides a disjointed, 
even lopsided, view of how change occurs in the international political economy. Investigating the 
role of QPIs is therefore important in informing us that change need not come from states’ interests 
in international regimes from two-level games, or the rise of private authority. It may also derive 
from the state’s capacity to institutionally innovate to mediate private capital and public interests in 
response to everyday politics. 
 
The article proceeds as follows: first I discuss the more general status of QPIs within the 
international political economy, arguing that they provide a unique way to link comparative studies 
of institutional variation amidst ‘neo-liberal globalization’, and invite us to study not only elite 
consensus but also to consider mass practices and attitudes about the fusion of private capital and 
public value. Following this section, I discuss the U.S. and Danish cases, discussing three themes 
in each case: 1) the impulses from everyday politics that led to the establishment of QPIs; 2) how 
mortgage QPIs transformed over time and what pressures they were particularly exposed to; and 
3)  contemporary challenges to how QPIs can fulfil their purpose of mediating the interests of 
private capital with public values. These three themes of establishment, transformation, and 
challenge are discussed for both cases, with the bulk of attention placed on the last quarter-
century. In the second section I discuss the U.S. case and highlight how mortgage QPIs were 
transformed in the 1980s and 1990s, and then compromised by George W. Bush’s administration. 
In the third section I discuss the Danish case, where I highlight how their mortgage QPIs were 
effectively privatized in the late-1980s from a need to conform with European financial integration, 
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a process that has altered how they relate to the Danish market for residential property. Finally, I 
suggest that examining the role of quasi-publics in the international political economy provides a 
sensitive understanding of how the mediating forces between the international and the national, the 
public and the private, are changing.  
 
 
QUASI-PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVERYDAY POLITICS 
 
What should be considered public and what should be considered private in the international 
political economy? Political economy has traditionally maintained a distinction between what is 
public and private, typically separating actors within public organizations as acting within states or 
bureaucracies who seek order and power, while actors within private organizations are profit-
seeking and market control. Detailed analyses of coalitional battles tend to follow these 
understandings. Similarly, discussions of global governance tend to assume a separation between 
public and private that obscure the introduction of new practices that readily blur the two. Recent 
work on ‘private authority’ has made strides in identifying how private actors have gained greater 
prominence in governing the international political economy (Cutler et al., 1999; Hall and 
Bierstecker, 2002), while recently Rawi Abdelal (2007) has demonstrated how much of this 
authority is not the replacement of public authority but delegation by government in a period of 
more internationalized private capital. What is public and what is private is blurred as regulatory 
stringencies, exemptions, and recognition of special status empower certain institutions over others 
(for example, consider bond rating agencies, see Sinclair, 2005).  
 
I suggest that QPIs provide a halfway house between what would normally be considered private 
capital and public value, as well as increasingly a mediating institution international and domestic 
capital needs. For example, the mortgage QPIs discussed here must confront their private 
shareholders while also dealing with the public responsibility that their particular regulatory status 
demands. In the U.S. case the government created mortgage QPIs for the community, while in 
Denmark they were created by community associations and then placed under tight regulatory 
control by government. Both cases provide examples of hybrid institutional forms that remind us 
that, even in a more globalised world economy, there is a great deal more institutional diversity 
than a simple war between efficiency-maximizing market-supporting institutions and presumably 
decaying welfare state-type pro-community institutions (Crouch, 2007). Rather, there is, at the 
same time, a reinforcement of distinct welfare-state regimes while also increasing convergence on 
reform trajectories for the regulation and governance of the international financial order (Hay, 
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2006). As QPIs are enabled by governments, they must situate themselves both within the 
domestic political economy and, more recently, also conform to requirements from the international 
political economy.  
 
Investigating QPIs affirms the importance of understanding institutional diversity in the international 
financial order, not least because they also point to the capacity for non-elite actors to have voice 
within their domestic systems, by calling upon governments to insist that QPIs behave according to 
their mandate to support not only private capital but public values. I suggest that QPIs, such as 
those discussed here, invite us to look not only at coalitional politics behind the creation of 
institutional forms, but also at everyday politics in how the broader population engage with property 
and finance in everyday life (Seabrooke, 2007; Langley, 2008). 
 
The work on ‘everyday politics’ (Hobson and Seabrooke, 2007) and ‘everyday life’ (Davies, 2006) 
has already been strongly linked with changes within the international financial order (Aitken, 2005; 
Seabrooke, 2006; Watson, 2007; Langley 2008). Such work, including that on the ‘financialisation’ 
of everyday activities (Froud, et al. 2007), typically seeks to understand how new financial 
practices are created through government regulation and the role of private institutions, and 
particularly to understand how they alter everyday routines, risk behaviours, and intersubjective 
understandings among the broader population. Such a conception of society separate from the 
normal institutions studied by political economists is certainly welcome and critical for the 
development of understanding how authority, legitimacy, and identity is not derived from 
institutions, or commanded or proclaimed by those who control them (Seabrooke, 2006: ch. 2). 
Rather, it also suggests that society at large has at least the potential to provide impulses for 
institutional change. As such, a conception of everyday politics is important for understanding how 
institutions change not only during a period of crisis through material and ideational battles among 
elites (Blyth, 2007), but also during periods of seeming ‘normality’ (Seabrooke, 2007).  
 
It is important to note that the literature on everyday politics from political sociology and political 
anthropology stresses how acts do not need to be ‘political’ in order to be important. For example, 
Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet’s (2005) work on why national collectivized agriculture failed in Vietnam 
points to how everyday politics came through expressive practices as seemingly minor as cheating 
on rice stocks or cheating stories and rituals to mock those in power (Kerkvliet, 2005; Scott, 1985). 
So while actors may chose to collectively act (such as within the U.S. fair housing movement 
discussed below), broader changes in how actors behave can provide impulses for institutional 
change. Intersubjective understandings among a broader population on how the economy should 
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work do not simply provide a ‘cultural toolkit’ to operationalise when movement entrepreneurs seek 
to engage in ‘politics’ (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001), but shape the boundaries of the 
everyday ‘thinkability’ and ‘logicability’ for those governing as well as those being governed (Hopf, 
2002: 13-15). As such, through ‘voting with their feet’ in taking-up new practices or rejecting them 
for the maintenance of the status quo, non-elite actors provide impulses to elites for institutional 
change (Seabrooke, 2007). This more fluid conception of politics is also more fitting for societies in 
which there is a weak connection to notions of class solidarity, or where there are ‘everyday 
makers’ who do not require an ideological position on a traditional political axis in order to promote 
their own conception of how the economy should work (Bang, 2005). In such cases, as with those 
discussed below, consensus among elites that is insufficiently communicated to the public can 
raise dissent and a change in everyday financial practices, both for and against the greater good 
for the society as a whole (Schmidt, 2003; Schmidt, 2007). 
 
 
MORTGAGE QPIs IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Establishment 
A potted history of mortgage QPIs in the U.S. shows that they emerged from crisis and complaint. 
The U.S. has a long history of attempts at mortgage securitization, including a failed try in the 
nineteenth century that burnt English investors, as well a 1920s collapse of real estate bond 
market schemes in New York (Snowden, 1995). But the institutional innovations themselves are 
difficult to understand without understanding the deep and broad social need for them. Indeed, the 
origins of U.S. mortgage QPIs can be found in attempts to alleviate economic instability within the 
private market through the suggestion of a government guarantee. In 1932, the establishment of 
the Federal Loan Bank system and then, in 1933, the Homeowners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC), 
permitted homeowners to borrow up to 80 percent of house price. By 1936 the institution had one 
in ten residences encumbered to it but was required to engage in massive foreclosures. Following 
this crisis experience, in 1938 the National Mortgage Association of Washington was created and 
soon renamed Federal National Mortgage Association (and known as Fannie Mae).  
 
The experience of institutional building during the Great Depression, akin to the creation of other 
national projects during this period of ‘embeddedness’ (Blyth, 2002), married public purpose with 
private capital. The institutional innovation of Fannie Mae had broad popular support. The 
increasing stress within this system was to expand access to owner-occupier residential properties, 
while continued reforms within the domestic financial system sought to foster credit access for the 
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middle classes. J. K. Galbraith, for example, commented in 1958 that the ‘process of persuading 
people to incur debt, and the arrangements for them to do so, are as much a part of the modern 
production as the making of goods and the nurturing of wants’ (Galbraith, 1962: 167). In 1963 the 
Community Investment Plan sought to extend such access and during the same period the 
introduction of credit cards (like VISA) ushered in the consumer credit era (Seabrooke, 2001: 60-1; 
Montgomerie, 2003). Everyday practices and changing attitudes concerning were important in 
affirming the presence of institutions that could safely support the extension of credit.  
 
Of course, the 1960s’ civil rights movement raised numerous concerns about who exactly had 
access to credit, particularly given the experience of ‘redlining’ communities, where some banks 
would literally draw lines around neighbourhoods they were willing to accept deposits from but not 
lend money to. Under the auspices of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Title VIII), the Fair Housing Act 
Ginnie Mae was created from Fannie Mae to cater particularly for low-income borrowers. 
Essentially, Ginnie Mae became the public arm of this system while Fannie Mae was transformed 
into a government sponsored private corporation with private shareholders. This institutional 
innovation followed calls for representation despite organised resistance from coalitions who 
sought to repeal or prevent fair housing legislation at the local and state levels (Gamble, 1997: 
255-6). Building on the federal government’s perception of the need for greater rights for lower-
income and minority groups, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 explicitly sought to 
tackle redlining and empower low-income and minority borrowers, in part through bolstering the 
capacity of groups, such as the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC), to provide a 
watchdog function.  
 
In addition to the above reforms, in 1970 the U.S. government charted Freddie Mac from Savings 
and Loans associations, with the task of providing (like Fannie Mae) a secondary market for 
mortgages, and specifically to permit the capital from mortgages to form a ‘pool’ that was then sold 
to investors (Seabrooke, 2006: 125, 130). Following the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, 
which permitted the siblings to securitize mortgages, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were therefore, 
in theory, endorsed as government sponsored enterprises to compete in the private market (with 
Ginnie Mae dealing with the ‘pure’ public market). The U.S. government’s ‘conjectural guarantee’ 
to support Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac built a strong perception that there is a line of credit from 
the Treasury should the QPIs have any problems fulfilling financial obligations to their investors 
(Schmid, 2003). As such, this ‘conjectural guarantee’ permits the QPIs to behave in non-market 
ways and effective subsidize mortgages through a large wholesale market that lowers the costs of 
capital (Schmid, 2003; Roll, 2003: 31). This guarantee also permitted investors to enter this market 
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with a great deal of confidence, leading to the transformation of these mortgage QPIs.  
 
Transformation 
During the 1980s the U.S. sought to further enhance the role of the QPI siblings within the 
domestic and international financial systems through the 1984 Secondary Mortgage Market 
Enhancement Act that brought in a more active secondary market for mortgage-backed securities. 
These changes were justified by the notion that by more efficiently recycling capital through the 
domestic system, mortgage QPIs could boost homeownership not only for the middle-classes but 
also for lower-income groups. Indeed, during the 1980s the presence of community groups and 
watchdogs, such as the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN, see 
Borgos, 1986; Sidney, 2003), was important for progressive legislation in the late-1980s and early-
1990s that affirmed the need for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to cater to low-income and minority 
groups as well as the middle classes. For example, in 1989 changes to the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975, which required mortgage lenders to collect information on 
borrowers, was expanded to data about who was denied loans, including information on income, 
gender, race, and location. (At the same time Freddie Mac was permitted to offer shares to the 
public rather only approved financial institutions). And in 1992 the Federal Housing Enterprises 
Financial Safety and Soundness Act required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to concentrate more 
on the lower-middle classes and minority groups, while the mortgage QPIs also standardized their 
credit assessment procedures that arguably diminished their capacity to do so (Stuart, 2003: 110). 
Also, community groups have successfully campaigned against mortgage QPIs, especially through 
public shaming, to encourage them to support sustainable communities and owner-occupation 
instead of ‘infamous slumlords (see, for example, Groarke, 2004). In general the system here was 
that mortgage QPIs could issue mortgage-backed securities from pools of capital derived from 
financial institutions that could specify that they had met the financial and social criteria required for 
business with Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie. Fannie and Freddie boomed throughout the 1980s and 
1990s (Stuart, 2003). In the same year the value of outstanding mortgage-backed securities was 
$1 trillion, with Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac issuing 90 percent of all new mortgage-
backed securities (Seabrooke, 2006: 126-7). By 2005 the market for outstanding mortgage-backed 
securities from these QPIs was approximately $3.8 trillion.  
 
An important element of this story is the extent to which financial de-regulation and re-regulation, 
as well as the role of foreign investors, altered the environment for QPIs in the 1990s. U.S. 
regulators’ especially permissive non-oversight in the 1990s allowed commercial banks to dabble 
in areas of finance where non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) were becoming especially 
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competitive (with the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 eventually formally reforming 
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 that had separated investment and commercial banking to permit 
‘financial supermarkets’). Around the same time the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
1992 introduction of Rule 3a-7 required all asset-backed securities to have a credit rating from at 
least one nationally recognized statistical rating organization (NRSRO), providing a boost to bond 
rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s as quasi-regulators (on NRSROs see 
Abdelal, 2007: 173). Implementation of the Basel Capital Accord of 1988 by 1992 also meant that 
the type of securities banks were holding was under more scrutiny. Within this environment the risk 
weighting for mortgage-related securities from QPIs was 20 percent while risk weighting for those 
from private market was 50 percent (until reforms in 2002). Understandably, the mortgage QPIs 
attracted significant foreign investment. By the late-1990s one-third of Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae outstanding debt issues were owned by foreigners, compared to around 13 percent for the 
U.S. mortgage-backed securities market in general (Roll, 2003: 36). As such, mortgage QPIs 
effectively became ‘the hinge connecting international credit markets to the domestic U.S. housing 
market’, making up a third of U.S. debt securities in the public and private market (Schwartz, 2007) 
and the siblings the largest issuer of debt in the U.S. after the Treasury. Their capacity to attract 
significant foreign investment (such as from the Chinese government) to subsidize the costs of 
capital to increase home ownership among the American middle and lower-middle classes 
demonstrated the power of QPIs within the international financial order, and the ongoing role of 
government in supporting U.S. international financial capacity. 
 
Challenge 
The creation of such financial capacity relied on the U.S. mortgage QPI’s mandate of fusing private 
capital with public value. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (2005) both explicitly state that their 
missions are to expand home ownership within the U.S., and especially among lower-income and 
minority groups. For example, Fannie Mae, in outlining its role in increasing minority 
homeownership states, that it is first and foremost an ‘instrument of the national policy that 
promotes homeownership because it is good for families, communities, and the nation’ (2003: 13). 
They have, however, also come under heavy fire from critics who accuse the QPIs of abandoning 
their support of public value for, instead, greater integration within the private market. For those on 
the right, then, the QPIs should be abolished as a quasi-socialist overhang from an outdated era, 
while for those on the left the QPIs have demonstrated ‘corporate wrongdoing’ through accounting 
scandals while not sufficiently provide for low-income and minority borrowers to justify their unique 
status.2
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The capacity of QPIs to fuse private capital and public value depends on how they are regulated 
and the extent of community support for them (expressed through protest or otherwise). In 
particular, within the U.S. context the regulatory enforcement in a period of delegated authority 
relies heavily on the appointment of top administrators for the QPIs, as well as for oversight for the 
CRA and other civil rights and fair housing legislation (Stuart, 2003: 196). For example, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac are only permitted to securitize or purchase mortgages that are ‘conforming’ 
with their charter. During the 1990s the mortgage QPIs relaxed their standards in order to provide 
greater access to mortgage credit for lower-income and minority groups (Stuart, 2003), including 
the purchase of sub-prime mortgage-backed securities. However, from 2001 onwards the stress 
was away from fulfilling this public value mandate (especially for first-time homeowners) and more 
on refinancing mortgages. For Freddie Mac between 2001 and 2003 there was a more than $300 
billion ‘extraction of home equity’ into the domestic economic that was largely spent on home 
improvements (Nothaft, 2004: 27). At the same time, growth in the private mortgage-backed 
securities markets boomed, with the mortgage QPIs share of securitized mortgages dropping from 
90 percent to 73 percent (CGFS, 2006: 14), creating nearly $2 trillion in debt that did not go 
through the siblings. And on top of this change, the mortgage QPIs were also used to soak-up sub-
prime problems prior to the 2007 crisis. While the mortgage QPIs held 11 percent of mortgage-
backed securities supported by sub-prime loans in 2001, in 2004 this figure had increased to 44 
percent ($176 billion), before decreasing to 35 percent in 2005 and 25 percent in 2006 (CGFS, 
2006: 17).3 The problem here was not so much the fact that the QPIs were permitted take-on such 
loans, but that they were not able to prevent the expansion of the market by insisting on its 
founding public values that reject discriminatory and predatory lending. The key culprit in 
generating the sub-prime crisis of 2007-8 was a failure in government regulation, including its lack 
of support for community oversight. 
 
These functions were impeded not only by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s leadership (including 
Fannie Mae’s hiding of $9 billion in earnings in 2004!), but also by a changing regulatory 
environment engendered by the Bush administration. The first step here was to impede the 
watchdog function of community-based groups, such as the NCRC, by reclassifying what is 
considered to be a small bank and, therefore, the extent of oversight for the CRA (which itself 
provides an effective subsidy on mortgages for low-income earners, see Canner, et al. 2002).4 For 
example, at the same time as the refinancing boom, 2001-3, there was a 54 percent increased in 
rejections of loan applications from African Americans to private financial institutions, while also 
growth of 40 percent of non-owner occupier mortgage for people on more than 120 percent of 
median income.5 The increasing prominence of non-bank financial intermediaries (such as 
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financial and insurance companies) within the primary mortgage market, exempt from CRA 
oversight, as well as smaller competitive banks who were under weaker oversight from community 
watchdogs, also further opened-up the private and predatory sub-prime market. Such regressive 
changes led the Department of Housing and Urban Development to complain in 2004 that the 
mortgage QPIs should ‘do what is expected of them—helping low- and moderate income families 
at least at the same percentage levels as primary market lenders’ (Seabrooke, 2006: 209). During 
the same period the administration argued that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should be completely 
privatized as only a ‘pass through’ service (as in, not permitting them to buy pools of mortgages 
from financial institutions), with the implicit guarantee of a line of capital from Treasury stripped 
from them.  
 
International organizations, such as the Bank for International Settlements, weighed in here as 
well, suggesting that the mortgage QPIs should ‘adhere more closely to their statutory role in 
providing liquidity to the market for securitized mortgages and avoid creating distortions in the 
primary mortgage market through their activities’ (BIS, 2005: 215). U.S. regulatory agencies had 
already taken on-board international standardization through reforms in 2002 effectively placed 
mortgage-backed securities from QPIs on a more equal footing with the private market and more 
reliant on risk assessments from bond rating agencies and financial institutions themselves.6  
 
U.S. mortgage QPIs’ challenge of maintaining a happy marriage between private capital and public 
value was therefore increasingly complicated by the rise of regressive U.S. domestic politics and 
the demands of international standardization that prized the technical evaluation of risks 
associated with private capital that was at some remove from social purpose. The delegation of 
authority to private actors that have little public accountability, like bond rating agencies, reinforces 
this disempowerment (Abdelal, 2007: 165). This has led community advocates in the U.S. to 
suggest that for mortgage QPIs to fulfil their mandate of mediating private capital and public value 
more stress must be placed on creating ‘laboratories of democracy’ at the state level, including 
more localized oversight on who private financial institutions lend to. At a more diffuse level of 
everyday politics, the widespread acceptance of mortgage securitization and stress on 
homeownership as a means of storing wealth may reinforce the notion that ‘sweat equity’, such as 
profits derived from investments in housing, is preferred to redistributive policies that improve the 
lot of low-income and minority groups (Prasad, 2006).  
 
The changes outlined above are significant for everyday politics in the U.S. precisely because U.S. 
mortgage QPIs have been founded on rights discourses from the Great Depression, and then civil 
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rights and ‘fair housing’ movements. The fact that U.S. mortgage QPIs provides information to the 
public on loans that it buys or securitizes provides ammunition to community watchdogs and ideally 
provides a source of democratic accountability (Stuart, 2003: 196). However, the power of 
community groups to have voice is in part dependent on political changes at the top of the 
administrative chain at the national level and changes during the Bush administration have actively 
disempowered community groups. In doing so, worsened conditions for low-income and minority 
borrowers fuelled a predatory sub-prime market that has led to a global credit crunch.  
 
 
MORTGAGE QPIs IN DENMARK 
 
Establishment 
Denmark has a longer history of a sophisticated mortgage bond system than the U.S., and its 
development reflects community-led developments to fuse private capital and public value. The 
origins of the Danish mortgage-backed securities system can be found in the late 18th century, 
when a mortgage bank was formed in response to a 1795 fire in which 941 houses were burnt to 
the ground. The community response was to form a cooperative for the reconstruction of houses 
and extension of mortgage credit. Following the Danish government’s 1848 creation of a national 
constitutional assembly (ending the absolutist period and entering constitutional monarchy), the 
recognition of the right to freedom of association led to calls for the recognition of cooperative 
associations. Accordingly, in 1850 the first Danish Mortgage Act recognized mortgage credit 
associations, particularly given the spread of land ownership among farmers from the aristocracy 
and political desire to provide mortgages to those considered near-creditworthy. Such recognition 
reflected community-led rather than state-led building of capacities (cf. Bogason, 1992), although 
the Danish state took an active part in the regulation of mortgage credit institutions after 1880. 
Innovations in the 1920s sought to extend Danes’ access to small landholdings (including loans of 
90 percent of the value from the government), but with no great stress placed on private residential 
housing. These markets were further developed after the 1930s, along with other social reform 
legislation in response to the Great Depression. An important aspect here is that the institutional 
innovation was, as with the case above, in recognition of a broader public value that extended 
beyond the interests of political and economic elites, accompanied by a view that change 
according to collective principles would be made ‘gradually, on an eclectic basis’ (Bernhard, 1951: 
644). 
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Importantly, the state came to regulate what was a community-driven activity that followed a rights 
discourse on the capacity to access a dwelling (not necessarily own it freehold) through mutual 
associations. Within this context what are referred to as mortgage credit institutions (MCIs) in 
Denmark have come under heavy statutory conditions, effectively making them marry private 
capital and public value.  For example, Danish MCIs are prevented by law from directly entering 
into other areas of financial services, other than through subsidiaries, and are not permitted to 
provide guarantees. They must also maintain a ‘balance principle’ established in the mid-
nineteenth century, where only mortgage bonds are permitted as a source of financing for their 
activities (IMF, 2007: 6). In other words, all residential property loans handled by private financial 
institutions must be supported by mortgage bonds, and these bonds must be, in turn, backed by 
already existing mortgages. In this sequence, investors provide capital to the bond market, which 
then provides capital to the MCI, which then provides capital to the homeowner in the form of a 
bond, which is then held by the MCI and sold to investors through the bond market. Within the 
Danish system mortgage banks legally have a senior claim to proceeds from properties sales 
following a default, and due to regulations on loan-to-value ratios it is highly uniform (unlike the 
U.S.). Prior to reforms in the 1990s, borrowers were jointly responsible for payments within a pool 
of mortgages, up to the limit of the value of the bond. As such, Danish MCIs provide a ‘pass 
through’ service and cannot purchase pools of mortgages like their U.S. counterparts. Within 
Denmark investors are not liable for capital gains tax on mortgage bonds, providing them will 
added value. Also, in further support of their status as a QPI, Danish MCIs are considered by the 
key regulator, the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (DFSA, Finanstilsynet), to be ‘average 
general risk’ rather than ‘high general risk’ (like commercial banks) (IMF, 2007: 8). Also, Danish 
MCIs also share information on their dealings with primary and secondary mortgage markets to 
ensure coordination. Given this system for stability, Danish MCIs boast that no bondholder has lost 
money in the history of the system, including through wars and depressions.7
 
Importantly, akin to the widespread perception that the U.S. government would bail out mortgage 
QPIs, should they experience financial problems, investors’ perception of the Danish system is that 
it benefits from a ‘broad political commitment to its integrity’ (Frankel, et al. 2004: 98). As such, 
they may be considered mortgage QPIs with private rather than public origins. This is in large part 
due to small number of players within the system (Denmark has Europe’s most concentrated 
mortgage market, with the top five lenders holding 95 percent of the market, see IMF, 2007: 4), 
and the size of the mortgage debt within the economy. The ratio of mortgage loans to GDP was 
100 percent in Denmark in 2003, compared to 81 percent in the U.S. (Frankel, et al., 2004: 97). 
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Transformation 
Like their U.S. counterparts, the Danish mortgage QPIs underwent reform in the 1970s, primarily 
with further standardization of mortgage financing. However, the biggest reforms occurred in the 
1980s and 1990s, primarily through involvement with the European Union (EU). During the 1980s 
mortgage contracts were liberalized in 1982 to permit more competition (and alongside interest 
rate deregulation, see Broome and Seabrooke, 2007). More significant, however, were reforms in 
the late-1980s that transformed the status of Danish mortgage QPIs to comply with a more uniform 
standard across European markets. Previously mortgage QPIs were, as suggested above, 
community-driven mutual associations under government regulation, with Danish individuals and 
families dealing with cooperative associations in order to acquire freehold and leasehold residential 
properties. A government-induced housing crisis in Denmark in 1987, through changes to tax code 
(Mortensen and Seabrooke, 2007), produced a domestic environment for institutional change that 
coincided with, and more importantly, the need to harmonize with European financial directives, In 
1989, just after Denmark had removed capital controls (Abdelal, 2007: 72), conforming with the 
EU’s Second Banking Directive required legal changes to the status of Danish mortgage QPIs.8
 
The key change here was the transformation of mortgage companies from mutual borrowers’ 
associations into publicly traded companies. The regulatory changes also permitted banks to 
acquire mortgage companies, presenting a clear case of Europeanization introducing financial 
liberalization and internationalization (Abdelal, 2007). As a consequence, Danish mortgage QPIs 
that were originally established as mutual associations and foundations (such as BRF Kredit, 
Nykredit, and Realkredit, some of whom date back to the nineteenth century), were joined by 
companies owned by commercial banks. The 1989 changes altered the environment not only for 
those obtaining mortgages within Denmark (explained below), but also provided more interest in 
the market from foreign investors. As such, the share of foreign investors holding Danish mortgage 
bonds increased significantly since the 1990s, from around 5 percent to around 15 percent of total 
investments being held by foreigners and 22 percent of Euro-denominated short-term callable 
bullet mortgage bonds (IMF, 2007: 14).9 As such, the Danish mortgage bond market became the 
second largest in Europe behind Germany.10 While much smaller than their American counterparts, 
the Danish QPIs are important players within European markets and critical for the financial health 
of the Danish economy.  
 
The domestic changes from financial re-regulation and deregulation from Europeanization are 
politically and socially significant given the extent of mortgage debt held and access to mortgages. 
Prior to 1989 Danish mortgage QPIs relied on customers going through commercial banks and 
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estate agents and with the introduction of the Second Banking Directive they bought up estate 
agents in order to change their operations from a wholesale to a retail basis. As such, and in 
contrast to the U.S. QPIs, who do not deal with individual customers but financial institutions, the 
Danish mortgage QPIs have directly engaged the public in competition with other financial 
institutions, with the bigger foundational institutions increasing the origination of loans (and 
therefore bonds) by some 38 percent in the early-1990s.11 At the same time integration with EU 
Capital Adequacy directives required the removal of collective responsibility for mortgage pools 
and increased stressed on individual ownership and responsibilities (OECD, 1995). Within the 
system, borrowers obtain a mortgage from the Danish QPIs that covers 80 percent of the value of 
the property, with the remainder commonly funded through commercial banks through a ‘top loan’. 
A key change here is the individualization of how residential property markets are treated within 
Denmark. As stated above, the origins of the Danish mortgage bond system come from a crisis 
response concerning collective access to mortgage credit, and change to the system was gradual. 
The past decade has provided a sharp contrast in changes in how ordinary Danes treat residential 
property markets.  
  
 
Challenge 
Compared to their European counterparts, the Danish mortgage QPIs provide extraordinary levels 
of access to credit for residential property and may be challenged by European harmonization. For 
example, the institutional arrangements in Denmark permit a 5 percent down payment for a 
mortgage for freehold property, compared to 20-30 percent in Germany (Whitehead, 1998: 23). In 
this sense it does more to absorb ‘nonconforming’ borrowers than many others European states, 
despite the absence of a subprime market (IMF, 2007: 14). Here Denmark differs strongly from the 
U.S. In the U.S. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac initially took on subprime loans to extend access to 
mortgage credit for low-income and minority groups, as well as complied with CRA regulations, in 
order to provide a form of welfare. Such compensation is based on the inadequacy of the 
conventional welfare system (Howard, 2006). Denmark, on the other hand, has a vigorous welfare 
state, often considered the most generous (Hay, 2006) and among the most ‘decommodified’, 
where ‘a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood 
without dependence on the market’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 21-22). Denmark’s extremely high 
taxation regime (a top marginal rate of 63 percent and average overall marginal rate of 44.5 
percent in 2006),12 and the development of mutual associations (such as those for mortgage credit 
prior to the EU-induced reforms) that work closely with government are important aspects of the 
welfare state. As such, Denmark reflects a classic ‘welfare trade-off’ where, despite significant, and 
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equally spread wealth, only half of the population own their properties in 2002 compared to 68 
percent in the U.S. (OECD, 2004: 135; on the welfare trade-off, see Kemeny, 1980; cf. Castles, 
1998).  
 
A key change from financial re-regulation in the 1990s has been the introduction of a more 
competitive and individualized residential property market where attitudes towards housing as a 
social right are gradually transforming towards a more Anglophone conception of housing as a 
means to wealth (Mortensen and Seabrooke, 2007). The status of Danish mortgage QPIs within 
this context is important given their change from community-based mutual borrowing associations 
into publicly traded companies that have effectively become holding companies competing for 
market share and product innovation. Within this context the reintroduction of adjustable interest 
rate loans in 1996, as well as the introduction of interest-only loans (for 10 years) in 2003 and 
capped-rate floating loans in 2004 (IMF, 2006: 41-2) represent not only new incentives for changes 
in market behaviour in Denmark, but new conventions about how the economy should work, and 
for whom.  
 
Change within the Danish system has not been predominantly domestic like the U.S. Rather, the 
driving force has been Europeanization, where policy change has been concentrated among 
political and financial elites and at some remove from the ‘ordinary’ population (Bieling, 2006; 
Schmidt, 2007). While convergence within the European mortgage bond system has been far from 
complete due to persistent national legal frameworks (Stephens, 2000), it is significant that the 
Danish government voluntarily opted to extend draft EU legislation to its mortgage market. For 
example, draft consumer credit legislation from 2002, which sought to update an ineffective 
attempt from the mid-1980s, was voluntarily applied to mortgage markets by the Danish 
government. Also, in anticipation of the European Capital Requirement Directives, which also 
brings in Basel II compliance, set for 2008, the Danish mortgage bond system was altered. Typical 
mortgage bonds were replaced with covered mortgage bonds (særligt dækkede 
realkreditobligationer) that permit delayed amortization beyond ten years is the value of the loan is 
less than 70 percent of the value of the property (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2007: 15). At the same 
time, lobby groups, such as the European Mortgage Federation, have continue to apply pressure 
for the removal of government regulations that prevent a totally flexible market, such as legally 
enforceable interest rate caps.13 Such pressure has led to discontent among some financial 
institutions within Denmark, who have otherwise maintained a long-standing corporatist tradition.14 
In general, the trend of reforms to Danish mortgage QPIs  provides another case of policy 
coordination among transgovernmental policy elites and the financial community that is largely 
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isolated from the concerns of social movements, trade unions, and even political parties (Bieling, 
2006: 429; cf. Warner, 2007).  
 
Changes associated with a combination of re-regulation to accommodate European harmonization 
and changing behaviour among ordinary Danes in residential property markets has led to a new 
politics within Denmark, along with the acceptance of new financial practices. For example, in 2002 
the Danish government froze taxable property values to gain widespread public support (IMF, 
2006: 45), especially the notion that tax burdens associated with property were too high. There 
have also been concerns about access to mortgage credit within the new financial environment. 
Mutual owner-occupiers’ associations, for example, have expressed concern over how changes 
within the housing finance environment are making it more difficult for ordinary Danes to acquire 
property. In particular, reform of the cooperative ownership housing system (andelsbolig), through 
a combination of government evaluations and andelsbolig association board meeting approvals 
(formed by residents who live, typically, within the apartment complex), has commonly led to three 
and four-fold increases in apartment prices and, in some areas of Copenhagen, twelve fold 
increases. The notion of housing as a social collective enterprise and especially as a social right is 
seriously in question and as of early 2008 there was an active political debate on the complete 
privatization of the once cooperative market for affordable housing.15  
 
The implication here is simple: the conventional Danish welfare trade-off permitted the population 
to place less stress on owner-occupation and more stress on paying high-taxes for welfare. 
Changing behaviour in relation to housing finance, especially the rapid uptake of new housing 
finance instruments that introduce greater risk to what has traditionally been a risk averse 
population (Mortensen and Seabrooke, 2007), suggests a sea change has occurred that will 
ultimately have an impact on the Danish welfare trade-off. As such, the capacity of Danish 
mortgage QPIs to fulfil their original purpose of mediating private capital and public value is altered 
as the residential property market is liberalised and, perhaps more importantly, individualised. 
Finally, there has also been an increased perception that mortgage QPIs are threatened by 
Europeanization. The publication of a white paper for the harmonization of housing finance 
markets in Europe in December 2007 led to immediate calls from the Danish Housing Finance 
Council for the protection of the unique status of Danish mortgages QPIs, in accordance with the 
will of Danish consumers.16 The trouble here is that the European process of financial integration, 
including mortgage bond markets, appears to be increasingly elevated above the level of domestic 
politics, never mind everyday politics. As with other aspects of European integration, this raises 
serious questions about a conflict between the notion of a European social model and the 
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implementation of directives for financial integration that are insensitive to local public values 
(Cafruny and Ryner, 2003).  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS: EVERYDAY POLITICS AND MORTGAGE QPIs 
 
This article has sought to place a spotlight on the role of quasi-public institutions as important 
actors in the international political economy that act as filters between domestic and international 
economies, and which were ideally created to mediate between the interests of private capital and 
public value. I have suggested that in the U.S. and Danish cases mortgage QPIs have traditionally 
provided this function. Both sets of mortgage QPIs were established by a collective rights 
discourse that required the state (in the U.S. case) or the community (initially in the Danish case) to 
respond to a widespread crisis. In the twentieth century both sets of QPIs were strengthened by a 
notion of collective rights to access credit for residential property ownership in a manner that used 
implicit government guarantees to attract domestic and, increasing, international investment. In the 
U.S. case, in particular, mortgage QPIs continue to be charged with the mission of not only 
providing capital recycling for the American middle-classes but also, ideally, providing more credit 
opportunities for mortgage credit for lower-income and minority groups. In the Danish case external 
pressures from European harmonization has transformed the broader public role of mortgage 
QPIs, and also encouraged a more individualised and liberalised market for residential property. 
 
I hope to have demonstrated that mortgage QPIs are significant players in the international 
financial order. Within the U.S. the mortgage QPIs are only second in issuing debt within the U.S. 
system to the Treasury. Within Denmark the mortgage QPIs provide the most concentrated market 
within Europe and, for ‘pure’ housing finance, box well above their weight within the common 
market. Both U.S. and Danish mortgage QPIs internationalized to a large extent due to reforms 
during the 1980s. With a third foreign ownership of mortgage-backed securities from U.S. 
mortgage QPIs and 15 percent of mortgage-backed securities of Danish mortgage QPIs, housing 
finance within these societies has significant foreign support. This support is primarily based on the 
regulatory status of the institutions as QPIs, the notion that in the U.S. case investors minds should 
be at ease because there is a line of credit from the Treasury should problems eventuate. 
Similarly, in the Danish case there is a strong perception that there is a broad political commitment 
to the mortgage QPIs and, especially given their market concentration, ‘too big to fail’. In both 
cases the unique status of these institutions has provided an effective subsidy on the costs of 
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capital for ordinary, everyday, homeowners. As such, the U.S. and Danish mortgage QPIs have 
been able to mediate between private capital and public value. 
 
I have, however, suggested that this capacity to mediate between private capital and public value 
has been impaired by recent changes and I conclude by discussing how the changes described 
above link to everyday politics. There is no particular ‘king hit’ explanation here in terms of what 
matters more for causal explanation, be it economic constraints or domestic political coalitions, etc. 
In order to learn from each other within political economy, we can understand how, for example, a 
domestic political coalitions argument can complement rather than compete with an argument 
suggesting that political coalitions and elites (including ideational entrepreneurs) must derive their 
powers of persuasion from identifying the boundaries of what is possible within a society (Blyth, 
2007). The point of attempting to understand everyday politics as impulses that emerge from the 
broader population to those who govern is to attempt understand the social sources of institutional 
innovation. Without attempting to find such information we may find it more difficult to establish 
counterintuitive trends within the international political economy, just as we may ignore institutions 
such as QPIs who do not readily conform to notions of state or market, public or private, or what is 
a liberal market economy as opposed to a coordinate market economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001; cf. 
Campbell and Pedersen, 2007). Indeed, without understanding the progressive role of U.S. 
mortgage QPIs in providing the institutional environment for foreign investment into bonds 
supported by residential home loans, it is difficult to understand what gave foreign investors 
confidence in a highly regressive and predatory market targeted at lower-income and minority 
Americans with poor credit histories. In short, the 2007-8 subprime crisis is difficult to fully 
comprehend without examining mortgage QPIs that emerged as innovations in response to 
everyday politics.  
 
In conclusion, QPIs are interesting for studies of the international political economy precisely 
because of their mission to mediate between private capital and public value. QPIs provide a 
means to reflect upon the institutional specificities of how states built international financial 
capacity based on compromises and arrangements between government, financial communities 
and the ‘ordinary’ population (cf. Konings, 2008). As mortgage QPIs were built upon created by 
rights discourses from the broader population, changes to how they behave in their domestic 
political economies and the international financial order calls us to question how those discourses 
are evolving. In doing so, it reminds us of the connection between everyday life and the 
international financial order, as well as the need for everyday politics to transform into political 
 22
voice to maintain widely held public values in a period where private capital is being given more 
authority by governments. 
 
NOTES 
 
                                                          
1 The U.S. and Danish systems are unique in permitting long-term, 30 year, mortgages with no penalties for early 
payment, see Frankel, et al. 2004. 
2 For example, on the right, S. Moore (2004) ‘Who Needs the NYSE?’, available at: 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2658. And, on the left, R. Nader (2006), ‘Letter to SEC Chairman Cox 
Regarding Fannie Mae’, available at: http://www.nader.org/index.php?/archives/669-Letter-to-SEC-Chairman-Cox-
Regarding-Fannie-Mae.html 
3 Testimony of J.A. Kennedy, President and CEO of the National Association of Affordable Housing Lenders on ‘The 
Role of the Secondary Market in Subprime Mortgage Lending’, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Credit House 
Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, May 8, 2007: 6. 
4 As stated by Sandra Braunstein, Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs at the Federal Reserve Board, 
‘Effective September 1, 2005, new CRA rules helped relieve about 1,800 intermediate small banks with $250 million to 
$1 billion in assets from previous CRA data collection requirements and from testing of bank investments and service to 
their respective communities’. As of January 1 2007, a large bank was reclassified as a depository institution with more 
than  $1.033 billion. For the CRA it faces a lending test, an investment test, and a service test. Small and intermediate 
banks are classified as those with between $258 million and $1.033 billion. They face evaluation on their record of 
lending to minority and lower-income groups in their assessment area. They are also expected to engage in community 
development activities. Those with less than $258 million are not expected to develop such activities. See the testimony 
of Sandra Braunstein, Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, on ‘Bank mergers, Community 
Reinvestment Act enforcement, subprime mortgage lending, and foreclosures’, Before the Subcommittee on Domestic 
Policy, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, at the Carl B. Stokes U.S. 
Court House, Cleveland, Ohio, May 21, 2007. 
5 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Database, National Aggregates, 
Table 5–2, 2001–03; Table 5–6, 2001–03. Data available at:_www.ffiec.gov/hmda/ 
6 The Agencies are: the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Treasury; the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and the Office of Thrift Supervision. 
7  ‘Survey of Danish Banking and Finance – Three Biggest Groups Back in the Black’, Financial Times, 7 April 1994. 
8 The EC drafted a directive on mortgage credit institutions within the European economy in 1984, but no further progress 
was made until packaged with wider standardization of financial markets.  
9 ‘Mortgage Banks: Home Loan Industry may be Reshaped’, Financial Times, 9 April 1997. 
10 While the German covered bond market is indeed much larger, it is supported by a large public loan segment that 
makes up some 85% of the market (IMF, 2007: 11). 
11 ‘Mortgage Banks: Home Loan Industry may be Reshaped’, Financial Times, 9 April 1997. 
12 http://www.skm.dk/foreign/statistics/marginaltaxforalltaxpayers.html 
13 Interestingly, this is justified on the grounds that such caps create ‘restriction of access to credit for certain consumers’ 
or, in other words, they prevent a subprime market that would permit just-creditworthy homeowners to acquire mortgage 
credit. See European Mortgage Federation (2005) ‘EMF Position Paper on the Commission Green Paper on Mortgage 
Credit in the EU’, Brussels, 29 November: 12. 
14 ‘Nye boliglån sprænger Realkreditrådet’, Børsen, 3 May 2007. 
15 ‘Politikere vil sætte andelsboliger fri’, Børsen, 11 March 2008. 
16 Hvidbog om realkredit i EU - optakt til øget harmonisering af realkreditmarkederne i Europa’, press release from 
Realkreditrådet, 19 December 2007. Avaialble at: www.realkreditraadet.dk/ nyheder/hvidbog071219/article.html The EU 
‘White Paper on the Integration of EU Mortgage Credit Markets’ is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/home-loans/integration_en.htm. 
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